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FINANCING THE PALLISER TRIANGLE,
1908 .. 1913

JOHN FELDBERG AND WARREN M. ELOFSON

A

the crucial vehicles in this tragedy was the
financial institution. Between 1908 and 1913
investment firms made available huge sums of
capital mainly from Britain to enable farmers
to commence and expand their operations. As
such they helped on the frontier to facilitate
the ensuing disaster.2 The purpose of this paper is to develop that thesis. It is not, however, to point the finger of blame. The money
managers were subject to some of the same
influences that nourished an overestimation
of the western frontier by the Canadian government, the Canadian Pacific Railway, and
indeed, the farmers themselves who clamored
for loans. 3 What follows is simply an attempt
to shed new light on this major historical event
by viewing it through the eyes of those who
he'lped finance it.
Investment in the Canadian west must be
seen as a reflection of the fact that in the
course of the nineteenth century the United
Kingdom, and in particular the city of London, had become the greatest ever international market for the export of capital. In
"real" pounds of 1913, total flows to the rest of
the world grew from an average of 40 million
pounds per year between 1865 and 1874 to

decade ago, David C. Jones compellingly
described the immense ecological and human
tragedy that occurred in the southern, semiarid districts of Alberta and Saskatchewan in
the late 191 Os and early 1920s. 1 Prior to World
War I settlers poured into these provinces
buoyed by dreams of a better life, but in the
decade or so following 1915 many who had
taken homesteads in the so-called Palliser
Triangle saw their hopes shattered by successive years of drought and crop failure. One of
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173 million pounds over the decade preceding World War 1. 4 The outward movement of
capital from Britain greatly exceeded that from
any other country and seems to have accounted
for between 40 and 75 percent of the total
from Europe as a whole. s Historians have told
us about the importance of the philosophy of
British economic imperialism in channeling
investment to the more independent states of
the empire. That theory was based on the belief that the empire was "no longer held together by diplomatic bonds but by the financial
commitments made by many influential British investors."6 Successive governments in
England had made, and had encouraged the
private sector to make, investments in the
more independent dominions such as Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand in part because it
was felt that economic ties would bolster the
mother country's influence where it was being
eroded in the strictly political sense. In the
case of Canada, Britain's perceived need to
compete with a growing American presence
seems to have been crucial. "From the British
angle, a politically independent, but economically dependent, Canada was an excellent offset to the rising power of th~ United States on
the American continent, and brought both
political and material gains."7
Thus by the time the prairie wheat lands
were being settled and expanded after the turn
of the twentieth century there was already in
place an ideology, a tradition, and an infrastructure for the exportation of British capital. However, in the period from 1908 to 1913,
the flow of capital from the mother country to
the prairie wheat farmers also involved a number of both "push" and "pull" forces that had
at least as much to do with immediate economic circumstances on both sides of the Atlantic as with long-standing theories of empire.
To British money managers, these forces
strengthened the appeal of investment abroad
in general while making the western wheat
frontier seem more inviting than perhaps it
was. 8
Among the push factors one of the most
important was the accumulation of enormous

pools of excess capital. The traditional imbalance in income distribution in British society
had concentrated the country's wealth in an
extremely limited number of hands. That circumstance tended in the first place to substantially restrict the purchasing power of the
nation's largest consumer group-the wage
earner-and produced chronic underconsumption. 9 The result by the turn of the twentieth century was a slowing of economic
growth across the British Isles in manufacturing businesses that produced for the domestic
market. This, in conjunction with the relative maturity and therefore capital self-sufficiency of many long-established corporations,
led to a more or less consistent shrinking of
credit requirements in industry. 10 At the same
time, the agricultural sector in Britain, previously considered reliable as an outlet for
capital, was experiencing economic difficulties that had originated in the 1870s in part
because of foreign competition. As a result,
investment companies had become much
more reluctant to provide conventional farm
mortgages. ll Furthermore, opportunities to finance government debt were dwindling by
the turn of the century. Successive British
ministries had attempted to cut down on borrowing and therefore had significantly reduced offerings of one of the safest and in
some respects most attractive domestic investments available, the government bond or
"consol."12
The consequence of contracting domestic
investment markets for British money managers was that their capital concentrations
continued to grow inordinately prior to World
War 1. This quite naturally produced a rather
dramatic fall in interest rates as is evidenced
by the fact that, for instance, the consols the
government made available were yielding less
than 3 percent by the 1890s. 13 The combination of limited domestic opportunities and
low returns created nothing less than a
scramble to find opportunities abroad. By the
beginning of the twentieth century over onehalf of the savings of British citizens was being invested outside the country.14
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TABLE 1
BRITISH INVESTMENT IN CANADA, 1900-13,
THROUGH SECURITIES, INSURANCE COMPANIES, AND MISCELLANEOUSI5

Year

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913

As Table 1 demonstrates, 1908 marked a dramatic increase in British investment in Canada
and the amount continued to climb almost
steadily to 1913. In the years just prior to the
war Britons were investing more money in
North America than anywhere else in the
world, and 75 percent of that was going to
Canada. 16 There were two basic reasons for
this. First, by the end of the nineteenth century, the United States and Australia, the two
countries that had previously attracted the
majority of British capital, had become much
more self-financing. 17 Second, this was the
great period of expansion in western Canada
associated with the opening of commercial
wheat production on the prairies and other
industrial developments. 18
The wheat industry was one of the two great
western Canadian outlets for British capital

In thousands of dollars

10,680
15,085
11,016
28,833
29,500
76,398
68,453
65,251
181,404
212,725
218,457
244,427
214,830
375,771

in these years; the other was railway construction. 19 What sets investment in the former
apart from that in the latter, however, is the
amount of risk involved. Britons generally recognized that anyone putting money into railways enjoyed insulation from major losses by
what seemed almost unlimited government
guarantees and support. 20 The wheat frontier
offered no similar risk protection to investors
and yet they put their money into it with comparable impunity. It should be said that
straightforward mathematical calculation undoubtedly played an important part in drawing British capital to western agriculture.
Demand for loans among the new settlers was
tremendous and money managers discovered
that, at a time when demand was drying up in
other areas both at home and abroad, they
could command mortgage interest rates as high
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as 8, 10, and in some cases, even 12 percent. 21
The return on many domestic investments
listed on the London markets in the prewar
years was often no higher than 1 percent. 22 It
was possible, therefore, for investors to borrow funds in London and loan them out in
western Canada at a substantial profit.
If investor enthusiasm was a reflection of
high interest rates on the frontier as well as
falling demand in other parts of the world, it
was also predicated on a belief that great things
were about to happen in this new hinterland.
The prairie economy appeared to hold out
wonderful prospects for future prosperity in
part because of the growing appeal of wheat
around the world. Per capita consumption rose
from 2.46 bushels in 1885, to 2.81 bushels in
1909, and between 1906 and 1913 the price,
after remaining more or less steady for over a
decade, climbed steadily from about $1.00 to
around $1.50 per bushel.23 Moreover, the increase in demand coincided with a period of
lower agricultural production throughout
much of Europe because of the difficulties farmers were having competing with foreign producers.24 The result was a growing need for the
importation of wheat in many European nations to feed rising populations. 2S This brought
a new appreciation of wheat as a staple commodity and subsequently produced a general
tendency to overestimate the value and stability of frontiers that seemed likely to produce it in large quantities. "Everyone knows
that wheat is on the same basis as gold," reported one writer in the Economist in early
1910. 26 Some two years later, when referring
specifically to the Canadian west, the president of the Trust and Loan Company of
Canada advised his shareholders that "when
they [have] those vast areas of fertile soil, producing annually immense crops of the necessities of life, it [is] impossible to doubt the
stability" of the entire countryY
Readily available export figures for Canada
in the prewar era indicated an increasingly
productive agricultural base consistently expanding with no sign of an end. 28 This seems
to have made financial institutions in Britain

positively euphoric about the potential of the
west. Their inclination to go overboard, so to
speak, and invest without awaiting the evidence of time no doubt reflected their natural
propensity to rationalize in face of the specific
circumstances outlined above. However, a sort
of "frontier mentality" also came into play.z9
Western Canada seemed to have an almost
unlimited amount of virgin soils and its potential was as yet unknown. Therefore, people
had difficulty keeping their estimation of it
within the bounds of reality. When encouraged by stable grain prices or favorable interest rates to believe that the region would be
fruitful, they began to see the prairies, stretching from Manitoba to the Rockies and four
hundred miles north of the forty-ninth parallel, as "one huge wheat field" that was certain
to have a substantial impact on "the food supplies of the world in the future."3o In the British House of Commons both government and
opposition acknowledged the "vast untouched
areas and fertile regions ... the British Empire
possesses" in western Canada and they accepted without hesitation estimates that those
regions had "the capacity ... for the growth of
four times the quantity of wheat required to
feed the whole people of the United Kingdom."3!
Among the lenders, this overestimation
helped produce a rather surreal faith in the
Canadian west that was difficult to temper.
We see this in their unwillingness to believe
that the basic security for investment, the land
itself, could significantly lose its equity value.
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the rate of appreciation was nothing short
of spectacular. Between 1900 and 1910 it
amounted to 123 percent in Manitoba, 185
percent in Alberta, and 201 percent in
Saskatchewan. 32 A fundamental knowledge of
economic trends in the other recently settled
frontiers of Australia and the United States
might have indicated that these rises could be
followed by substantial falls. 33 However, few
were prepared to give this much real thought.
"Farm lands are increasing in value steadily,"
wrote the Financial Post in 1911, "and will
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continue to do so in proportion to the increase in immigration which is phenomenal at
present."34 Whether it would be possible to
sustain the dramatic upward momentum for
much longer was a point of considerable debate, but even some of the most guarded prognosticators argued that at worst, farmland in
the west would be likely to avoid excessive
declines. 35 In the Palliser Triangle plummeting land values, which were to accompany a
decade of drought starting in 1916, were soon
to demonstrate just how misguided such assumptions could be.
Equally chimerical was the confidence
shown in science and technology on the western frontier as a means to overcome any and
all deficiencies of climate, terrain and soil.
When they had seen enough of this country to
realize its flaws, many people did not moderate their initial enthusiasm but insisted that
new techniques would not only overcome
natural barriers but in fact would turn them
into great material advantages. "With productive resources steadily increasing in the form
. of better implements of agriculture, better railroad facilities and the extending area of
civilisation," they insisted, "there is no doubt
whatsoever but that the debt the West is assuming is a light one."36 The "cultivation of
wheat in the Canadian West has been greatly
promoted by the multiplication of railways and
the improvement of implements, including the
introduction of traction engines and steam
ploughs."37 One of the problems farmers had
was the short growing season and the consequent possibility of crop failures due to frost.
The introduction of new, faster-maturing
strains of wheat such as Red Fife and Marquis
significantly alleviated doubts on that score.
Indeed, by 1912 it experts confidently predicted that these strains would allow the regular harvesting of wheat in the central and even
northern parts of Alberta and Saskatchewan,
thus making the entire west far more productive than anyone had ever dreamed. 38 "The
area of land capable of growing wheat in the
West is constantly expanding as hardier varieties are evolved .... [T]he pioneer finds that

the country in latitudes once deemed hopelessly cold and sterile is quite as fit for farming
as that further south," wrote a contributor to
the Economist. 39 Since that time, of course,
early frosts have continued to devastate crops
from Calgary to Peace River.
Science, advocates of the west argued,
would eventually conquer other problems as
well. From early on some observers were warning of possible difficulties as a result of soil
exhaustion and abuse. Many farmers were producing valuable cash wheat crops from the
same cultivated acres year after year with little
regard for weed control or for preserving nutritional and moisture levels for the future. 4o
Yet concerns were mollified by assurances that
eventually an advanced system of crop rotation, through a mixed instead of straight grainfarming approach, would not only save the
land but enable it to bring forth wheat crops
indefinitely. Even "if the present money result
was no greater," it was argued, "mixed farming
in which ... crops are partly used on the farm
to feed stock, would so sustain the value of the
land as to pay handsomely in the long run."41
Some analysts claimed that while the earlierestablished districts in the south might be
forced to reduce total wheat production for a
time while making the transition to mixed
farming, the slack would be taken up by the
more remote areas as the new strains of wheat
became available. "It is tolerably certain," they
estimated, "that the older west ... will before
long take to mixed farming, leaving the region to the north of existing settlements to be
the wheat-belt for the future."42 Thus the Canadian west in general was certain to remain a
dynamic, prosperous, and secure agricultural
region, and fears about the potential and value
of any particular parts were cast aside.
Such predictions overlooked the natural
environment of the southern Canadian plains.
Mixed farming on a large scale was and is impossible in much of this area mainly because
the climate and other elements are not conducive to animal husbandry.43 There are not
enough freshwater sloughs, lakes, and streams
to water livestock, nor sufficient annual
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precipitation to produce adequate pastures,
roughage hay, or greenfeed crops. Science was
simply a placebo to overcome the doubts of
men who wanted to believe they had a marvelous new region in which to invest: it was
hailed as a means of overcoming major problems such as inadequate rainfall in the Palliser
Triangle. In this case the answer was the
Campbellite method of dry-farming, which
mistakenly advocated deep plowing of the soil,
subsurface packing, and frequent cultivation
to draw up moisture from the depth of the
earth through capillary action. 44 Misguided
faith in this approach and in advancements in
the technique of summer fallowing made at
the experimental research farm at Indian
Head, Saskatchewan, induced confidence that
the entire southern plains could in fact go on
increasing output more or less forever. 45
The farmers themselves must have shared
this view. When they completed the provingup requirement on their homesteads, they contiIlUed to increase their demands for capital.
"It is the man without money who is forced on
to the free lands and to the hardships of homesteading," an article quite rightly pointed out.
"When the land does become his property,
after complying with the requirements of the
homestead law, he is, generally speaking, ready
for a substantial loan and he generally borrows all he can."46 The settlers had lots of uses
for leverage. They bought more land or replaced "the team of oxen with horses" or abandoned the sod shack in favor of a proper woodframe dwellingY
As dreams of prosperity on the frontier, the
desire to invest, and the demand for money
came together between late 1908 and 1913,
capital poured into the Canadian west. 48 The
importance of overseas money was eagerly acknowledged by the press. "A great deal of the
expansion in Western Canada has been financed by mortgage and loan companies
which have lent large sums, secured in the
most part in Great Britain, on farm land and
town lot mortgages," the Financial Post observed. "These companies [have] been profitable to stockholders . . . [and] have been

instrumental in the development of the
West."49 A number of investment vehicles
were used to unite borrowers and lenders: existing trust and loan companies shifted their
business into the region and new joint stock
companies and syndicates were formed to solicit capital. It did not take Canadian interests long to participate in importing British
capital once they realized the profits they
could make. Companies such as the Canada
Permanent found they could raise capital by
placing five-year debentures on the British
markets at a comparatively low rate of between 3'/2 and 4 percent. 50 New companies
were often formed as joint operations of Canadian and overseas partners. Usually local
investors would assemble a corporation whose
directorate included one or more prominent
Britons. The Canadians then traveled to Britain in the hopes of raising funds, using their
relationship with their associate to enhance
the general reputation of the corporation. 5'
The fund-raising could be done either through
stock or debenture issues, or through private
placements with individuals. Syndicates were
also formed that consisted of small groups of
businessmen who raised capital issuing shares.
This often obliged British affiliates to call on
their families, friends, and business colleagues. 52 Larger companies generally raised
capital on the stock or money markets.
It would be wrong to suggest that in Great
Britain all financial interests were caught up
in the general enthusiasm for these ventures.
Edinburgh was the preferred source for corporations' fund-raising on the open markets because there was some resistance to debentures
ofloan and mortgage corporations in England.
English reticence centered on the fact that
the bonds of such companies were infrequently traded on the capital markets and
therefore were relatively difficult to liquidate;53 Nonetheless, there was undeniably a
great interest in Britain as a whole in bankrolling the western Canadian frontier. In 1890
there were only seven British companies operating in this country. By 1914 fifty new British investment firms had moved to Canada.
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TABLE 2
LOAN COMPANIES OPERATING IN ALBERTA
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1909 55
Company Name

Alberta Societe Anonyme Belge
British Columbia Permanent
Colonial Investment
Colonial Investment (Winnipeg)
Canada Landed
Credit Foncier
Canadian Loan and Realty
Canada Permanent
Dominion Permanent Loan
Edmonton Mortgage Corporation
Empire Loan
Great West Permanent
Guelph and Ontario
Investors Guarantee
London and Canadian Loan Company
McDougall and Secord
North of Scotland Mortgage Company
Ontario Loan and Debenture
Reliance Loan and Savings
Royal Loan and Savings
Sun and Hastings
Trust and Loan Company of Canada
Union Trust Company

Of these, twenty-one were formed directly as
mortgage companies or trust and loan companies involved in mortgage extensions. The
other twenty-nine operated as general investment firms, making loans to industry as well as
to the agricultural sector. Only two restricted
their activities to eastern Canada; the others
operated either primarily or exclusively in the
west. 54
A list of the expenditures of the major
companies operating in Alberta at the end of

Amount Invested

$ 160,000.00
584,530.00
318,828.00
12,757.40
50,747.40
1,024,521.61
16,982.12
12,242.57
1,515,779.09
40,412.50
73,155.36
418,030.51
182,542.35
10,000.00
3,700.00
1,926,087.23
619,240.00
73,917.13
49,175.00
315,734.25
72,859.72
24,473.90
283,179.75

1909 (see Table 2) indicates not only the enormous amount of capital that was being injected into the province by this time but also
of the confidence that money managers in
general placed in western farm mortgages. In
addition to the trust, loan, and mortgage companies, moreover, many life insurance firms
participated. 56 Many of these, especially those
conducting business in Scotland, had invested
heavily in agricultural mortgages in the pastY
The insurance firms were swept along by the
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same faith in the Canadian frontier that their
competitors had. The "return on loans secured
by western 'improved' lands is so high," reported the Post, "and the likelihood of depreciation in the value of the land is so remote,
that such institutions as do not require ready
convertibility for large portions of their funds,
find them particularly desirable."58
The corporations entered the frontier either by setting up branches in one or more of
the major western Canadian urban centers or
by making arrangements with a financial institution already established. In 1909 the
Standard Life Assurance Company made arrangements with the Winnipeg-based Royal
Trust Company whereby the former agreed to
devote a specified portion of its assets to farm
mortgages, principally in Saskatchewan and
Manitoba. The entrance of this major British
corporation ushered in an unprecedented influx of old world insurance capital into the
Canadian agricultural sector. Assets oflife insurance companies in the three prairie provinces as a whole rose to a total of $48,364,000
by 1909 and $70,113,000 by 1911. 59
Of course, the Canadian chartered banks
were also involved in financing the western
farmers. 6o Indeed, the banks were strained to
the limit in attempting to meet the demand
on the prairies and they too found ways to
increase their presence as the investment rush
proceeded. 61 On 7 January 1911 the Financial
Post reported that the Canadian banks had
constructed twenty-six new branches in
Alberta, sixty-nine in Saskatchewan, and
thirteen in Manitoba. At that time, 118 Canadian chartered bank branches were operating in the three prairie provinces out of a
total of 256 in the entire country.62 It should
be noted, however, that by law the Canadian
chartered banks were not allowed to take
mortgages on real estate. Their participation
was through short-term loans on liquid assets, which in the case of the Triangle were
the harvested wheat crops. Therefore, the domestic institutions were neither as heavily
committed nor nearly as vulnerable as the land
investors. 63

The growing presence of the Canadian
banks seems to have bolstered enthusiasm
abroad by contributing to the image of the
frontier as a sound, sensible, and potentially
rewarding outlet for capital. 64 At any rate, international participation continued to climb
and new mechanisms were designed to attract
capital primarily of a private nature. Hence
the "guaranteed mortgage" was established
through which the mortgage company would
negotiate a loan, attend to the administrative
and legal details, collect the interest and principal, and look after the payment of any outstanding taxes and insurance premiums on
behalf of an individual or a private institution
in Britain in exchange for a fixed percentage
of the interest. One of the advantages of this
mode to the individual investor was that he
was able to hold title to the mortgage himself.
As a consequence the funds were directed into
a specified asset rather than into a mortgage
company's general operating account. To make
the investment doubly attractive, the company also undertook to guarantee the investment, even if the value of the land should
decline. 65
As a result of such expedients investment
funds continued to flow in. "The desire to
meet the demand is strong because during the
past year, and the past twenty years, the farm
loans have been thoroughly satisfactory," it
was pointed out in early 1910. "Managers of
the older companies which have had large sums
invested for over twenty years say that losses
are quite rare and immaterial and that interest
payments are well kept Up."66 Many firms
shared these sentiments.67 In February 1910
the London and Canadian Loan Company
announced that as a result of the active demand for money at favorable interest rates, it
was increasing its mortgage activity.68 New
capital also began to arrive from European
countries other than Great Britain. In April
1910 a Canadian directorate based in Edmonton announced that it had made arrangements
with a group of financiers in France to bring
$2 million into western Canada to be made
available for mortgages. The new company
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would be known as the Caisse Hypothecaire
Canadienne, or the Canadian Mortgage Company.69
The 1910 wheat crop was one of the worst
on record but the financial community was
undeterred. Reflecting on the character of the
settlers, the Financial Post noted that "though
they had a drought, those who live in this
country ... know that though they be unfortunate in some years, others come around
which compensate them for the loss. "70 The
poor crop year actually increased loan company business; many farmers, finding that crop
failures had left them desperately short of
capital for the winter, were forced to seek
loans to sustain them until the next harvest.
Some who were fortunate enough to have a
crop were anxious to finance improvements
to their homesteads and buy more land. Others wanted to payoff what they had already
bought. 71 Because the financial institutions
continued to increase their offerings, the poor
harvest had no discernible adverse effect on
land values. "The country has demonstrated
itself beyond any shadow of a doubt," it was
announced. "[Because] only the remnants of
the condition which tended to keep the price
of land down remain, ... we realise that there
is an end to the supply."72
Reasoning of this sort gave many a dangerous sense of well-being. They clung to the belief that the western frontier was endowed with
special qualities making it impervious to forces
that had operated elsewhere. Thus, for instance, in an interview with the Calgary Herald, S. H. Mapes, the head of the Metropolitan
Security Company, acknowledged that in "the
eastern states, and in fact in all older countries, the value of a property mortgaged has a
tendency to decrease in value." However, "in
these western provinces, a tendency all the
time is for the property to improve in value."73
In his 1911 annual report, W. G. Gooderham
noted that, out of$4 million outstanding, there
were practically no debts in arrears. "The
prompt payment of interest and principal," he
said, "is very characteristic of Western borrowers, and is another desirable feature of the
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loaning business in Western Canada."74 Of
course he did not concede that when credit is
readily available it is usually the case that few
people fail to meet their obligations if only
because they are able to borrow more money.
Companies indicated that pressure for credit
was so high they were forced to turn away
clients. 75 With such an excess of demand over
supply, it was not long before additional
sources of finance presented themselves. Some
of these were firms entering the west for the
first time. In April 1911, Douglas Fortayne,
the managing director of the Netherlands
Transatlantic Mortgage Company, publicized
the fact that his company was coming to
Canada to invest in Manitoba, Alberta, and
Saskatchewan. Supported by two of the strongest banks in Holland, it planned to lend at
least $1 million annually for farm mortgages. 76
It joined three other Dutch-based companies
(the Holland-Canada Mortgage Company, the
Netherlands Mortgage Bank of Canada, and
the Rotterdam-Canada Mortgage Company)
already operating on the Canadian prairies.
By late 1912, together with another Dutch
company (the Overseas Mortgage Company
established in 1912), it had inj ected over
$10,400,000 into the western Canadian
economy.77 At the same time, some of the
British firms already in western Canada found
ways to generate more capital. The Trust and
Loan Company of Canada announced that it
was issuing an entirely new series of stock. It
stated that "the proposed new capital would
be invested chiefly and almost entirely in
Saskatchewan and Alberta. "78 The directors
felt confident in this move because they were
investing in "not only the most remunerative
bllt also the safest part of Canada, namely the
new ... [wheat] lands in the West."79 The
confidence in the region demonstrated by this
company and several other European firms did
not go unnoticed by the financial press. In
December 1911 the Financial Post observed
that "from Europe, especially, this year there
has been a steady flow of money .... In addition to the enterprise of Dutch, Belgian and
French Investors, Britishers appear to have
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awakened to a greater extent than usual to the
opportuni ties in the Canadian West. "80
The positive outlook with respect to the
Canadian prairies continued to flourish
throughout the latter part of 1911 and into
1912.81 It was not until toward the end of 1912
that the old world sense of urgency about investing in the west began to diminish for the
long term. By then some four-fifths of the patented land on the prairies had been mortgaged. 8z The most important reason for the
decline appears to have been that demand for
capital for industrial expansion and military
development prior to and during World War I
caused a rise in interest rates in Europe. 83 This
encouraged money managers to channel more
investment into the home market. It did not,
however, provide for a mass exodus from
Canada. Professor Jones demonstrated that
when drought struck the Palliser Triangle in
1916, the financial institutions were caught
with loans on crops that did not grow and
acreages that were more or less worthless. 84
The McGibbon Commission, assembled to
investigate the disaster in Alberta, supported
the farmers' belief that the banks had gone
"beyond liberality" and "granted altogether too
much credit."85 It should be reiterated that
the farmers themselves had almost certainly
been influenced by the same visions of success
on the frontier as had the companies to which
they had thronged for capital.
The institutions were drawn (and pushed)
to the prairies by a complex set of circumstances, some of which had originated in parts
of the world that were far removed from western Canada. It is clear, however, that the frontier itself, working on the imagination,
reinforced all these circumstances. Professor
Douglas Francis has demonstrated that the developing Canadian west stirred dreams of paradise not only in settlers, the government, and
the Canadian Pacific Railway but also in a
host of writers, poets, and artists. 86 Painting
by painting, poem by poem, story by story,
people with well-known names including
Kinderdine, Jeffreys, Murphy, and Connor
constructed a myth about a wonderful land

that was to be not only more stable and prosperous than any that had come before but also
healthier, wiser, and more free. There was no
compelling pragmatic reason for creating such
a picture. These people could have made just
as great an impact by unveiling a wild land full
of real hardships and incalculable dangers.
However, it seems to be human nature that
when one finds oneself standing at the threshold of a frontier one feels a strong proclivity to
visualize utopia. Unless some striking negatives assert themselves, caution is lost as the
best-case scenario develops into a widely accepted expectation. In 1910 an observer writing specifically for the banking audience in
Canada commented:
The world's gaze and capital are being directed towards what is unquestionably the
richest country in the world . . . . I have
seen... [the banks in the west] open up a
branch in a townsite where but a few buildings had sprung up ... using for an office a
tent or a board shack. . . . [I]t is not the
building nor the name of the bank that wins
out, but rather the man at the helm, the
man who understands Western ways, he who
extends the glad hand and says, "come in
friend we want your business."87
These words express the widespread exuberance for the frontier during the settlement
period and provide direct evidence that it
helped to inspire the financial fraternity, along
with almost everyone else, to reason away caution in the wheat fields of the west.
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